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A B S T R A C T   
Scottish mental health legislation includes a unique criterion for the use of compulsion in the delivery of mental 
health care and treatment. Under the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act, 2003, patients must 
exhibit ‘significantly impaired decision-making ability’ (SIDMA) in order to be eligible for psychiatric detention 
or involuntary psychiatric treatment outside the forensic context. The SIDMA requirement represents a 
distinctive strategy in ongoing international efforts to rethink the conditions under which psychiatric compulsion 
is permissible. We reconstruct the history of the Scottish SIDMA requirement, analyse its differences from so- 
called ‘fusion law,’ and then examine how the SIDMA standard actually functions in practice. We analyse 100 
reports that accompany applications for Compulsory Treatment Orders (CTOs). Based on this analysis, we pro-
vide a profile of the patient population that is found to exhibit SIDMA, identify the grounds upon which SIDMA is 
attributed to individual patients, and offer an assessment of the quality of the documentation of SIDMA. We 
demonstrate that there are systemic areas of poor practice in the reporting of SIDMA, with only 12% of CTOs 
satisfying the minimum standard of formal completeness endorsed by the Mental Welfare Commission. We 
consider what lessons might be drawn both for the ongoing review of mental health legislation in Scotland, and 
for law reform initiatives in other jurisdictions.   
1. Introduction 
We are living through a period of intensive reassessment of the legal 
standards and mechanisms used to authorise involuntary medical 
treatment, particularly in the context of mental illness or impaired ca-
pacity. Within the UK, this reconsideration has led to an innovative new 
statute in Northern Ireland, an independent review of the Mental Health 
Act in England and Wales, and the commissioning of a root-and-branch 
review (ongoing at the time of writing) of mental health and mental 
capacity law in Scotland (Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland), 2016; 
UK Department of Health and Social Care, 2018; Secretariat to the Re-
view of the Mental Health Legislation in Scotland, 2019). This paper 
contributes to these continuing discussions and debates by scrutinising a 
distinctive provision of Scots law in this arena: the so-called SIDMA 
requirement in current Scottish mental health legislation. ‘SIDMA’ is an 
acronym; it stands for significantly impaired decision-making ability, spe-
cifically in connection with ability to make decisions about medical 
treatment. It is a concept unique to Scots law.2 In the Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act, 2003 (hereafter: the Act), SIDMA 
plays a role in several provisions regarding the exercise of coercive 
power in the context of mental disorder, including (but not limited to): 
the criteria for emergency detention in hospital (sec. 36, up to 72 h 
detention); the criteria for short term detention in hospital (sec. 44, up to 
28 days detention); and provisions regarding applications for compul-
sory treatment orders (CTOs) (secs. 57 and 64). For both emergency and 
short-term detentions under the Act, the assessor must believe that the 
person is likely to have SIDMA; for CTOs the person must be shown to 
have SIDMA. 
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1 Former CEO of the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland.  
2 No other jurisdiction of which we are aware includes the SIDMA requirement found in Scots law. For a survey of mental health legislation with similar provisions, 
see Cronin, Gouda, McDonald, and Hallahan (2017). Perhaps the closest variant on SIDMA is the broader ‘impaired judgement’ requirement that figures in sec. 3(1) 
(b)(i) of the Mental Health Act (Republic of Ireland) (2001) in the Republic of Ireland. 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijlawpsy 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2021.101736 
Received 26 May 2021; Received in revised form 12 August 2021; Accepted 13 August 2021   
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 78 (2021) 101736
2
In what follows, we describe and critically assess the current practice 
of SIDMA-assessment in Scotland. We begin by reviewing the history of 
SIDMA, which finds its origins in a 2001 report that informed the 
drafting of the Act. Returning to that report and its reception, we 
identify both the policy objectives that SIDMA was designed to achieve 
and the rationale for adopting SIDMA as the means for achieving those 
ends. We then review a 2010 study which examined the operation of 
SIDMA in practice, and report on our own (partial) replication of this 
study ten years on. Our replication study takes the form of an analysis of 
medical reports for CTO applications held by the Mental Welfare Com-
mission for Scotland (hereafter: the Commission). Our main aims in that 
analysis are threefold: (a) to examine the grounds on which persons are 
currently deemed to have SIDMA; (b) to compare recording practices 
regarding SIDMA in 2019 with the practices reported in 2010; and (c) to 
provide a critical evaluation of the quality of current SIDMA-reporting 
by assessing the extent to which current practice conforms to guid-
ance. We also used this as an opportunity to expand upon the 2010 study 
in line with recent developments in human rights by assessing the extent 
to which practices of supported decision-making are reflected in these 
formal assessments of decision-making ability. 
Domestically, we hope that our findings will help improve current 
practice under the Act and inform ongoing deliberations about whether 
and how it should be amended. Internationally, our aim is to raise 
awareness of both the promise and the pitfalls associated with an 
understudied approach to mental health law reform, and to assess a 
distinctive strategy intended to deliver mental health care and treatment 
(including coercive interventions when necessary) while increasing 
respect for patient autonomy. 
2. Background 
Shortly before the opening of the newly devolved Scottish Parlia-
ment in 1999, the Scottish Government commissioned a review of the 
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984. The outcome of the review is known 
colloquially as ‘The Millan Report’; formally its title was: New Directions: 
Report on the Review of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (Scottish 
Executive, 2001a; hereafter: Millan).3 One of the ‘new directions’ rec-
ommended in the report was the addition of a new criterion for 
authorising compulsion in care and treatment for mental disorder. The 
Millan Report did not itself use the term ‘SIDMA,’ but it proposed that 
compulsion be used in the delivery of mental health care outside forensic 
contexts only if: 
as a consequence of the person's mental disorder, the person's 
judgement is impaired to a nature or degree which would justify 
compulsory measures. (Millan, 63). 
We shall refer to this as the impaired judgement condition. The Millan 
Committee proposed that this new criterion should function as an 
additional prerequisite for compulsion – over and above the re-
quirements that are familiar from earlier legislation and other jurisdic-
tions: the presence of mental disorder of a nature or degree that requires 
treatment, risk of harm to the patient or to other persons. 
The Millan Committee's innovative recommendation was motivated 
in part by two widely shared policy objectives: promotion of patient 
autonomy and avoidance of discrimination. Both autonomy and non- 
discrimination figure prominently in the ‘recommended principles’ 
that the Millan Committee enumerated at the head of its report. As 
regards autonomy, the Committee stated that ‘[w]herever possible care, 
treatment and support should be provided to people with mental dis-
order without recourse to compulsion’ (Millan, 19). As regards non- 
discrimination, the Committee held that ‘[p]eople with mental 
disorder should whenever possible retain the same rights and entitle-
ments as those with other health needs’ (Millan, 18). 
In looking for ways to advance these policy objectives, one widely 
discussed strategy has come to be known as fusion law – so-called 
because it involves ‘fusing’ elements of mental capacity law and 
mental health legislation. To understand what is distinctive about fusion 
law, we must keep in mind that Scotland's Mental Health Act 1984, like 
most mental health statutes around the world, was indifferent to a pa-
tient's decision-making ability. The criteria for the use of psychiatric 
coercion focused on illness and risk; the question of whether the patient 
had the ability to make his or her own decision about treatment was not 
part of the statutory formulation.4 Advocates for fusion law, by contrast, 
propose to reserve psychiatric compulsion for patients who lack the 
mental capacity to make their own treatment decisions. Such an 
approach, it has been argued, serves both to increase patient autonomy 
(by allowing patients to make their own treatment decision whenever 
they are able to) and to decrease discrimination (by bringing the legal 
framework for mental health treatment into closer alignment with the 
legal basis for the treatment of physical illness or injury).5 
The Millan Committee's endorsement of the impaired judgement 
condition is best understood as a kind of compromise with fusion law. In 
their review, the Committee considered but rejected the inclusion of a 
capacity test among the conditions for use of compulsion. The Com-
mittee's view was that while such an approach might have a number of 
advantages, there were also ‘strongly held views against making a ca-
pacity test the fundamental criterion for intervention’ (Millan, 55). They 
reported on concerns that such a framework ‘might discourage early 
intervention’ (Millan, 56), and indicated that ‘[m]any of our re-
spondents also felt it to be wrong that a person with a mental disorder 
would be allowed to bring severe harm to himself or herself, perhaps 
including death, on the basis of a judgement that the person had the 
capacity to make such a decision’ (Millan, 56). The impaired judgement 
standard was therefore proposed as a kind of compromise – adding a 
new prerequisite for the use of compulsion but stopping short of ‘full 
fusion’. 
The Millan Report did much to shape debate in the new Scottish 
Parliament. Scottish legislators followed Millan's recommendation in 
plotting a middle path between the status quo ante and a full fusion 
approach. But in doing so, they also took a further step closer to the 
fusion law approach. Where the Millan recommendation spoke of 
impaired judgement, the Scottish Government explicitly introduced the 
concept of impaired decision-making ability into the criteria for compul-
sion.6 The final statutory language does not adopt the kind of capacity 
test backed by fusion law proponents; instead, the new condition was 
SIDMA. As regards eligibility for emergency detention, for example, the 
law requires that: 
because of the mental disorder, the patient's ability to make decisions 
about the provision of medical treatment is significantly impaired. 
(sec. 36(4)). 
The same language was included in the statutory conditions for 
short-term detention in hospital (Mental Health (sec. 44) and for the 
issuance of a CTO (secs. 57 and 64). 
Two details of the legal provisions that established SIDMA will be 
particularly important in what follows. Notice first the use of the words 
3 The Millan Commission first met in March 1999; the devolved Scottish 
Parliament opened in May. The final report of the Millan Commission was is-
sued in January 2001. 
4 For an analysis of the reasons for detention provided in medical reports 
under the 1984 Act in practice, see, Bean, McGuckin, and MacPherson (2000), 
ch 5.  
5 For discussion of fusion law, see Szmukler & Holloway, 2000; Szmukler, 
Daw, & Dawson, 2010; Szmukler, 2017  
6 The rationale for the change from ‘judgement’ to ‘decision-making ability’ 
was articulated in the Scottish Executive's policy statement that was issued in 
advance of consideration of the bill by the Scottish Parliament. See Scottish 
Executive, 2001b, para. 3.6. 
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‘because of’ in the statutory language pertaining to SIDMA. The new 
criteria for compulsion introduced with the Act require not only the 
presence of SIDMA; they also require that SIDMA be caused or explained 
by the person's mental disorder or impairment. But what would be 
particularly significant for the subsequent implementation of SIDMA is a 
second feature of the final legislation: the Act offers no definition of 
SIDMA. The consequence: the new statute left considerable scope for 
interpretation in applying the new prerequisite. 
It is important to keep in mind that there is a statutory definition of 
decision-making incapacity in Scots law. The Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act, 2000 (hereafter: AWIA), adopted just two years before 
the Act, includes such a definition.7 But both the Training Manual and the 
Code of Practice for the new Act make it clear that “SIDMA is not the 
same as ‘incapacity’ under the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act, 
2000” (Scottish Executive, 2005a, 45; see also Scottish Executive, 
2005b, para. 1.22–24). This in turn yields a further challenge for prac-
titioners, who are expected to apply two legal standards pertaining to 
decision-making ability: the standard defined in the AWIA and the un-
defined concept of SIDMA in the Act. 
In the years since the adoption of the Act, a variety of attempts have 
been made to provide practitioners with the guidance they need in order 
to apply the SIDMA standard consistently in practice. The Training 
Manual associated with the new legislation explained the concept of 
SIDMA as follows: 
SIDMA occurs when a mental disorder affects the person's ability to 
believe, understand and retain information, and to make and commu-
nicate decisions. It is consequently a manifestation of a disorder of mind. 
SIDMA arises out of mental disorder alone; ‘incapacity’ can also arise 
from disease of the brain or impaired cognition, and can include physical 
disability. SIDMA is not the same as limited or poor communication, or 
disagreements with professional opinion. (Scottish Executive, 2005a, 
p.45; see also Scottish Executive, 2005b, para. 1.22).8 
The Code of Practice indicated that SIDMA refers specifically to ‘a 
significant impairment with respect to decisions about the provision of 
medical treatment for mental disorder’ (Scottish Executive, 2005b, para. 
1.25). It also echoed the language of the Manual in emphasising that 
SIDMA ‘is not the same as having a problem communicating or dis-
agreeing with professional opinion’ (Scottish Executive, 2005b, para. 
1.27). 
Five years after the 2003 Act came into force, Shek, Lyons, and 
Taylor (2010) undertook an analysis of CTOs that had been initiated 
under the new legislation. Their study analysed the SIDMA field on 100 
anonymised CTOs held by the Commission pursuant to the Commission's 
statutory role of monitoring and promoting best practice in the use of the 
Act. The study aims were partly descriptive and partly normative. 
Descriptively, their study sought to identify the most common grounds 
that were cited by assessors in support of a finding of SIDMA. Norma-
tively, they assessed the adequacy of the cited evidence, identifying both 
best and worst practice. The 2010 study thus gave an important first 
portrait of how this innovative but undefined Scottish legal concept was 
actually being applied in psychiatric practice. 
One finding of the 2010 study was that impaired insight featured 
frequently among the reasons cited by assessors in their finding of in-
capacity (Shek et al., 2010, 239). ‘Insight’ is a concept that occurs 
frequently in psychiatric discourse, but which has also been the subject 
of controversy.9 Although it lacks an agreed formal definition in medi-
cine or law, it is commonly used to refer to a patient's self-awareness of 
illness or impairment. A patient who is aware that they are living with a 
mental disorder and who is able to identify at least some aspects of their 
condition as symptoms will commonly be described in clinical discourse 
as ‘having insight.’ A patient who is ill but lacks awareness of their 
illness will commonly be described as ‘lacking insight’ or as having 
‘impaired insight’ (Oyebode, 2018; Sims, 2002). Shek and colleagues 
found that impaired insight was the single most commonly cited ground 
for a finding of SIDMA, appearing in 58% of the analysed CTOs; in 44% 
of cases, impaired insight was the only reason cited as evidence of 
SIDMA. Other grounds cited in support of a finding of SIDMA included 
limited cognitive function (13%) and the presence of psychotic symp-
toms (24%).10 
On the basis of their study, Shek et al. made a number of recom-
mendations pertaining to SIDMA. They recommended that CTOs should 
indicate ‘the actual reasons for SIDMA,’ and that assessors should 
include in their reports an explanation of ‘how the individual's mental 
disorder … affect[s] their ability to make decisions about treatment’; 
assessors should not simply record the condition or disorder. Where 
impaired insight is thought to be a factor in SIDMA, Shek and colleagues 
called for assessors to explain how lack of insight affects the person's 
decision-making ability.11 Finally, they proposed that an adequate 
justification of a finding of SIDMA should specify whether ‘the indi-
vidual [is] able to understand, retain, make and communicate decisions 
about treatment, and if not, why not’ (Shek et al., 2010, 242). 
The fifteen years since the Act came into force has been an excep-
tionally active period in the law and practice surrounding the assess-
ment of decision-making ability. Just as the Act came into effect in 
Scotland in 2005, the Westminster Parliament adopted the Mental Ca-
pacity Act 2005 (hereafter: the MCA) for England and Wales, providing 
its own statutory definition of mental incapacity, and setting up a 
specialist Court of Protection. Internationally, the UN adopted Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) in 2006, which 
was ratified by the UK in 2009. Both the MCA and the UNCRPD con-
tained provisions that called for steps to be taken to support people to 
make their own decisions wherever possible. (Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
sec. 1(3); UN General Assembly, 2006, art. 12(3)) Some have called for a 
‘paradigm shift’ from so-called ‘substitute decision making’ to ‘sup-
ported decision-making.’ (Bach & Kerzner, 2010; Bartlett, 2012; 
Dhanda, 2007; UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
2014). There has therefore been intensive interest in techniques for 
supporting persons with impaired decision-making ability to make their 
own decisions, and to recover decision-making abilities when these are 
lost or impaired (Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, 2017a). 
7 According to the AWIA, “‘incapable’ means incapable of— (a) acting; or (b) 
making decisions; or (c) communicating decisions; or (d) understanding de-
cisions; or (e) retaining the memory of decisions, as mentioned in any provision 
of this Act, by reason of mental disorder or of inability to communicate because 
of physical disability” (AWIA 1(6)). 
8 The first sentence of this explanation echoes language from Scottish Exec-
utive (2001b para. 3.7). The claim that SIDMA ‘arises out of mental disorder 
alone’ should be understood in light of sec. 328(1) of the Act, which defines a 
mental disorder as any mental illness, personality disorder or learning 
disability, ‘however caused or manifested.’ 
9 See e.g. the exchange between Guidry-Grimes (2019) and David and Ariyo 
(2021).  
10 These percentages add up to more than 100% because 16 forms analysed by 
Shek et al. cited more than one grounds for the finding of SIDMA. At one point 
in their paper, Shek et al. report that they ‘found that the most common reasons 
for SIDMA were lack of insight (44%)’ (Shek et al., 2010, p.241). But this 
statistic excludes cases where insight was cited as one among several grounds 
for a finding of SIDMA.  
11 In England and Wales, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) made a similar recommendation: “If a practitioner believes a person's 
insight/lack of insight is relevant to their assessment of the person's capacity, 
they must clearly record what they mean by insight/lack of insight in this 
context and how they believe it affects/does not affect the person's capacity” 
(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2018: 25). 
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Following the approach taken by Shek et al. (2010), we extracted 
100 consecutive CTOs from the records held by the Commission. The 
Commission is a non-departmental governmental body which has a 
statutory duty to monitor the use of the Act and to promote best practice 
(sec 5). As part of that role, all detentions under the Act must be reported 
to the Commission. Our analysis covered CTOs with a starting date be-
tween January and February 2019. 
Applications for a CTO are made by a Mental Health Officer (MHO) – 
a social worker with additional training in mental health and illness – 
and are accompanied by two reports made by two medical practitioners 
(sec 57). Ideally one should be provided by an Approved Medical 
Practitioner (AMP) and the other by a General Practitioner (GP). An 
AMP is either a member or fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists or 
a medical practitioner with four years whole time equivalent working in 
mental health services. This is in keeping with the expectation that the 
GP might provide longitudinal knowledge of the patient and the psy-
chiatrist particular expertise around the current episode of illness 
(Scottish Executive, 2005b, para. 3.11). The forms are identical and 
require the practitioner to state how well they know the patient. From 
the list of forms submitted to the Commission, we alternated between 
the first and second form listed in support of an application. Where a GP 
is unavailable the second report may be provided by another AMP, 
subject to ensuring that there are no conflicts of interest. 
From routine information completed on the form, we extracted basic 
demographic characteristics (age, gender, and diagnosis) of the person 
being assessed, whether the clinician completing the form was a GP or 
an AMP, the clinician's familiarity with the patient, and risk of harm to 
the patient and/or others. We categorised this information in the same 
manner as in the study by Shek et al. (2010) in order to facilitate rele-
vant comparisons. As part of the application for a CTO, the clinician also 
has to provide a reason for the detention and justify why the patient is 
considered to have SIDMA. We transcribed all information from the part 
of the form containing the SIDMA justification. 
3.2. Data analysis 
Following transcription of all 100 forms, a coding framework was 
developed by the project team, led by MB, to provide a structure for 
coding information provided in support of the claim that the patient 
exhibited SIDMA. The coding framework was initially drafted using 
categories from Shek et al., 2010 and Mental Welfare Commission for 
Scotland, 2017b. To reflect progression in human rights-based ap-
proaches to mental health law through the ratification of the UNCRPD in 
2009, we also recorded whether the forms noted any evidence of sup-
ported decision making. Although the UNCRPD was ratified after the Act 
came into practice, the Act is underpinned by principles which include 
participation wherever possible (sec. 1(3)(c)). The coding framework 
was piloted by MB on ten forms and discussed with AC and the wider 
project team; this exercise was repeated at 20 forms. 
Conducting the pilot coding exercises revealed that there were 
findings of SIDMA that were not captured in the categories identified by 
Shek et al., 2010. Some assessors cited the inconsistency of the patient's 
decision-making as a basis for a finding of SIDMA; others included 
treatment non-adherence or treatment non-concordance as a basis. We 
also found examples of what can be described as ‘proxy’ reasons such as 
the presence of a guardianship arrangement or a power of attorney that 
were taken to imply that the person being assessed had SIDMA. For the 
full coding exercise, we adopted the expanded coding framework as 
presented in the Supplementary File. 
The expanded coding framework was then applied to the data set. 
Lack of insight had emerged as the biggest single factor in the previous 
study. Forms were coded as citing insight as a ground for a finding of 
SIDMA if one or more of four conditions were met: (a) the form explicitly 
used a form of the word ‘insight’ (‘insight,’ ‘insightless,’ ‘insightlessness,’ 
etc); (b) the SIDMA field of the form described the patient as not 
believing, accepting or agreeing that they have a mental health problem; 
(c) the SIDMA field of the form described the patient as failing to 
comprehend or understand their mental health problem; (d) the SIDMA 
field described the patient as failing to recognise the value of treatment 
(Gurbai, Fitton, & Martin, 2020). All cases that were coded for ‘insight’ as 
a ground for a finding of SIDMA were independently coded by a second 
coder (TH); discrepancies were resolved through discussion between MB, 
AC, TH and WM. All analysis was conducted in Excel and descriptive 
frequency statistics were calculated for each of the relevant codes. 
3.3. Quality assessment 
Like Shek et al., our aims in conducting the analysis of CTOs were 
both descriptive and normative. In assessing the normative adequacy of 
the SIDMA fields, we adopted our standard from a 2017 Commission 
paper that provides guidance on the assessment of SIDMA in the context 
of eating disorders (Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, 2017b). 
We deemed the SIDMA field to be formally complete only if it met all 
three of the following conditions: (a) it reported on specific symptoms of 
a mental disorder; (b) it indicated which component(s) of the overall 
decision-making process was impaired (e.g., the abilities to understand, 
retain, use and weigh); and (c) it indicated that there was a link between 
these first two elements, as required under the ‘because of’ clause in the 
statutory requirement. We also calculated the readability of each of the 
SIDMA fields, using the Flesch Reading Ease (Farr, Jenkins, & Paterson, 
1951; hereafter: FRE) score as a proxy indicator of the likelihood that the 
text in the SIDMA field would be readily intelligible to patients and 
others who support them. The use of accessible language in CTOs is a key 
consideration in terms of the ‘participation’ of the individual, which is 
one of the principles of the Act. 
4. Results  
a) The Assessors: The majority of the 100 mental health reports were 
completed by an AMP (87%), with a minority completed by GPs (13%). 
This was similar to the previous study where 86% were completed by 
AMPs. Of the 13 forms completed by GPs, 12 patients (92%) were 
known to the practitioner and one was unknown prior to the interview 
in relation to the CTO. In the 87 forms completed by AMPs, 34% of 
patients were unknown to the clinician prior to interview, 31% were 
known prior to the interview, 22% were known since the admission, 5% 
were known since transfer to the ward or the care was transferred to the 
clinician. Seven forms were left blank for this information.  
b) Age and Diagnosis: The mean age of patients in the sample was 50 
years (range 16–90 years), with 53% male patients. The main di-
agnoses of patients were Delusional Disorder, Schizophrenia or 
Schizoaffective Disorder (36%), Alcohol-Related Brain Damage, 
Korsakoff dementia or other (25%), depression (12%), Bipolar Dis-
order (13%), Learning Disability (9%), Personality Disorder (4%), 
Eating Disorder (2%). A comparison of the main diagnoses in the 
study by Shek et al. (2010) is presented in Fig. 1. 
c) Reasons Reported for SIDMA: In their 2010 study, Shek and col-
leagues reported four categories of reasons for SIDMA: lack of 
insight, confusion/cognitive impairment, psychotic symptoms and 
other reasons (including severe depression and learning disability). 
In our sample we found a similar percentage of forms where the 
clinician noted psychotic symptoms as reason for SIDMA to the 
previous study (21% and 24%, respectively). As regards the inclusion 
of lack of insight as the basis for a finding of SIDMA, we found an 
even higher rate than was reported in the 2010 study: 76% cited lack 
of insight, compared to 58% reported by Shek and colleagues in 2010 
(Table 1). In our study, 62 forms provided more than one reason for 
SIDMA, compared to only 16 in the previous study. In our analysis 
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we identified five forms in which no evidence of SIDMA was cited; no 
cases of this kind were reported by Shek and colleagues.  
d) Quality Assessment: The 2017 guidance from the Commission indicates 
that SIDMA-assessors should record the symptom of the mental disor-
der that impacts the decision-making process (Mental Welfare Com-
mission for Scotland, 2017b). Most of the forms (93%) noted a symptom 
which contributed to the individual having SIDMA, however only in 18 
of these forms (18%) did the clinician identify the specific aspect of the 
decision-making process that was impaired. Only 12 forms indicated a 
clear link between the specific symptom of the disorder and the spe-
cifically affected part of the decision making process. That is, only 12% 
of CTOs that we analysed satisfied the minimum standard of formal 
completeness that we drew from the Commission's 2017 guidance. 
e) Supported Decision Making: We found only four examples of sup-
ported decision making, which we interpreted in the broadest 
possible sense to include any steps taken to enhance the person's 
ability to make decisions. The main techniques recorded were 
repetition, rephrasing of information, or revisiting the decision at a 
later date. One form noted that the information had been simplified 
but did not expand on how that had been done.  
f) Readability: The median FRE score was 45.1 (IQR = 26.4–57.7), 
which is significantly below the recommended target of 60 (Lim & 
Bennett, 2020). Only 21% of forms had a RFE of 60 or above. Inter-
estingly, the lowest scoring forms did not tend to have a lot of medical 
terminology, and poor readability did not generally result from reli-
ance on jargon. We did identify several low-readability forms that 
appeared to be written by the same assessor. Low scoring forms tended 
to have particularly long and grammatically complex sentences. 
5. Examples 
In analysing the nature and extent of the shortcomings in current 
practice, it is worth focusing first on the applications for CTOs in which no 
evidence was provided of the presence of SIDMA. The total number of cases 
in this category was small (just 5 in total; i.e., one in 20), but not without 
importance. As an example, in one of these CTO applications the SIDMA 
field was completed with only one sentence: ‘Mr X is unable to make de-
cisions about his care and treatment.’ Notice that this is an assertion about 
Mr. X's inability to make decisions, but no evidence or documentation in 
support of that assertion is provided. Another CTO included considerably 
more words, but failed to provide any evidence that directly addressed the 
question of the person's decision-making ability. See Box 1. 
The legal significance of these five cases is considerable. Under the Act, 
the use of compulsion in the delivery of psychiatric care outside the forensic 
context requires evidence that the patient has SIDMA. The authorisation of 
compulsory treatment in the absence of such evidence is therefore un-
lawful. The parameters of the present study did not allow us to determine 
whether that evidence may have been provided elsewhere – whether in 
other portions of the mental health reports themselves or in the context of a 
Tribunal hearing. But the absence of such evidence from the portion of the 
form devoted to SIDMA would certainly be a cause for concern. 
In a second, and somewhat larger group (n = 12), the case for a 
finding of SIDMA rested entirely on an unelaborated and unsupported 
claim of impaired insight. These were particularly problematic because 
of the combination of three features: (i) the claim about impaired insight 
was the only rationale offered for a claim of SIDMA; (ii) no explanation 
was provided as to what was meant by impaired insight; and (iii) no 
causal or explanatory link was offered to indicate the impact of the 
impaired insight upon the person's decision-making abilities. See Box 2 
for three examples of forms that fall into this second group. 
Responses in this category fail to conform to standards of good 
practice, since they neither explain what is meant by impaired insight 
nor attest to the ways in which the patient's impaired insight impacts 
upon their ability to make decisions. 
A third group comprised cases in which evidence was cited in the 
SIDMA field, but no explanatory or causal link was established between the 
condition cited and the person's decision-making inability. This pattern 
was exhibited in just over half of the cases that we analysed. The amount of 
information included varied considerably within this group: in some cases 
the information was very minimal; one read in total: ‘Psychosis; no insight 
into illness.’ In other cases, considerably more information about the pa-
tient was provided. But in none of these cases did the record of assessment 
indicate the consequences of these aspects of the patient's presentation 
upon their ability to make decisions. See Box 3 for an example. 
Fig. 1. Diagnosis of patients (Shek et al. inner circle; current study outer circle).  
Table 1 
‘Reasons’ for SIDMA.  







Shek et al. 
(2010)b 




76 (76%) 25 (25%) 21 (21%) 35 
(35%)  
a Other reasons include learning disability/difficulty, manic illness and 
mental illness, depressive symptoms, agitation, inability to communicate, 
anorexia/anorexic cognitions, alcohol misuse, emotional instability, consistency 
of thought, executive function, illicit substance misuse, Korsakoff's, obsessional 
interests, organic illness, and suggestibility. 
b One mental health report in Shek et al. was excluded as it was unreadable (N 
= 99). 
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It is important to emphasise that the picture was not uniformly bleak. 
As noted, 12% of the CTOs satisfied the standard we had adopted for 
assessing recordings of SIDMA. See Box 4 for examples. 
6. Discussion 
Two decades after the Millan Report, Scotland is once again in the midst 
of a review of the legislative framework pertaining to mental health care 
and treatment. While there have been many significant developments in 
the interim, several important constants remain. The terms of reference for 
the current review (hereafter: the Scott Review) reaffirm Scotland's 
commitment to the policy objectives of enhancing patient autonomy and 
non-discrimination (Secretariat to the review of the mental health legis-
lation in Scotland, 2019). Moreover, the option of ‘fusing’ mental health 
and mental capacity legislation remains on the table – a cause significantly 
advanced by the adoption by the Northern Ireland Assembly of the Mental 
Capacity Act (Northern Ireland), 2016. As we have documented in Section 
2, Scotland sought to navigate this policy terrain two decades ago by 
adopting a distinctive direction of travel, introducing SIDMA as a middle 
path between the status quo ante and a ‘full fusion’ approach. The current 
review panel will need to decide whether to continue down this path. In 
effect there are three broad options: to retain SIDMA unchanged, to modify 
SIDMA, or to abandon SIDMA. 
The choice among these options must be informed by the full delib-
erative and consultative processes of the review and any subsequent 
legislative proceedings. Nonetheless, the findings that emerged from our 
analysis are certainly relevant to the policy decision facing the Scott Re-
view, and have a broader relevance for other jurisdictions that are 
reconsidering the legal threshold for the use of psychiatric compulsion. 
In considering the relevance of our findings to these policy options, 
we note first that we found evidence that SIDMA is indeed fulfilling 
some of the original purposes envisioned in the Millan Report. As we 
have seen, SIDMA was introduced in part because of concerns about 
possible unintended consequences that might result from a ‘full fusion’ 
approach. At the time of the Millan Review, the Royal College of Psy-
chiatrists in Scotland expressed concern that people with eating disor-
ders, mood disorders, or obsessive-compulsive disorder might be 
excluded from treatment by a capacity test (Millan, 55). Moreover, 
because capacity tests are time-specific, there was concern that patients 
exhibiting fluctuating capacity might be excluded from eligibility for 
compulsory treatment under a fusion approach, despite being in urgent 
need of care (Millan, 56). As regards these concerns, we found evidence 
that SIDMA is indeed working as intended, introducing consideration of 
decision-making ability into the CTO process while nonetheless facili-
tating detention of persons in all these categories. 
However, our analysis of CTOs also uncovered evidence that raises 
serious concerns about SIDMA-assessment and SIDMA-reporting in 
current psychiatric practice. As we have seen, 5% of the CTOs that we 
analysed failed to record any evidence that SIDMA was present. Twelve 
percent based the finding of SIDMA entirely on an unelaborated claim 
that the patient lacks insight. Eighty-eight percent of the CTOs failed to 
meet the minimum criteria for formal completeness in the reporting of 
SIDMA, with assessors frequently failing to identify a link between the 
person's mental disorder and their impaired decision-making ability, as 
required by law. Moreover, we found evidence indicating that the 
readability of the SIDMA fields in CTOs was often poor. Conversely, we 
found little evidence of steps taken to provide support for those whose 
decision-making abilities was impaired. 
How can these shortcomings best be explained and remedied? The re-
sults from our analysis do not provide sufficient evidence to answer these 
questions definitively, but it is worth surveying some possibilities. A nat-
ural starting point is the existing guidance for practitioners who must apply 
the SIDMA standard. As we have seen, there is a no shortage of SIDMA 
guidance in the Training Manual, in the Code of Practice, and in publications 
from the Commission. If nothing else, this guidance could and should be 
reviewed and updated to ensure greater consistency and clarity. As we have 
seen, the existing guidance is not entirely univocal, and some of the most 
recent guidance has been formulated only for use in the context of eating 
disorders, which comprises only a tiny portion of the relevant population. 
So a review and updating of guidance would certainly be a welcome step. 
We are doubtful, however, that revised guidance alone will suffice to 
ensure high quality SIDMA-assessment. It is important to appreciate that 
many of the failings identified in the present study constitute clear de-
partures from existing guidance. At the very least, new guidance would 
need to be combined with a new training curriculum on SIDMA and 
more robust quality-control mechanisms in the process of assessing 
applications for CTOs. But we must also consider the possibility that part 
of the problem lies in the underlying legislation itself. As we noted at the 
outset, one striking feature of the SIDMA provisions in the Act is that 
they leave the concept of SIDMA undefined. Moreover, the statute's 
reliance on the term ‘significantly’ introduces an unavoidable element of 
vagueness into the current legal standard. The statute itself therefore 
Box 1 
Example of a SIDMA field that failed to provide any evidence in support of a finding of SIDMA.  
Mr X at the start of the year, despite giving a verbal agreement to remain an in-patient, left the ward contrary to that agreement and travelled to Y, 
necessitating police involvement in his return to the ward. He has a history, when out in the community of failing to engage with his CPN, being non- 
compliant with treatment and drinking to excess. This results in him becoming floridly psychotic.    
Box 2 
Three examples of the contents of a SIDMA field in which the only evidence of SIDMA consists in an unexplained claim that the person lacks 
insight.  
Lacks insight into current situation and into her own mental health difficulties. 
Mr X demonstrates little insight into the extent of his chronic mental illness, care plan and demonstrates significantly impaired decision making ability. 
Insight fluctuates greatly - unable at times to accept advice/boundaries given for his benefit.    
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fails to project any particular structure for the assessment of SIDMA, 
leaving assessors themselves with considerable latitude in reaching a 
determination as to its presence or absence.12 One possible response to 
the current shortcomings in practice would be to adopt a statutory 
definition of SIDMA that could be used to inform new guidance and to 
structure training, assessments and reporting. Doing so would have the 
additional advantage of marking a clear distinction between the SIDMA 
standard and the concept of mental capacity defined in the AWIA. 
Whether in reviewing guidance and training, or in contemplating 
statutory reform, the data from our study show the need for greater clarity 
on the relationship between impaired insight and SIDMA. Taken together, 
the Shek et al. study and our own data clearly demonstrate that impaired 
insight is consistently the single most commonly cited ground for a finding 
of SIDMA. In a significant subset of cases, insight is the only ground offered 
in support of such a finding. Because SIDMA lacks a statutory definition, 
there is no clear way to determine whether impaired insight alone is a le-
gally sufficient warrant for a finding of SIDMA. Existing guidance on this 
question is less clear than it might be. In particular, greater clarity is needed 
on the difficult question of whether a patient's disbelief of diagnostic or 
treatment information itself suffices to establish that their ability to make a 
treatment decision is significantly impaired.13 
7. Limitations 
The present study was based on an analysis of administrative records 
associated with CTOs. We did not study the assessment of SIDMA in 
emergency or short-term detentions. We did not undertake to study the 
processes used by assessors in preparing such applications, nor the 
scrutiny undertaken of the SIDMA-reporting at the person's Mental 
Health Tribunal hearing. A fuller consideration of the role of SIDMA- 
assessments in authorising coercion would need to incorporate a thor-
ough examination of these further processes. In examining CTOs, we 
extracted the SIDMA data from the larger CTO applications, leaving the 
possibility that relevant information contained in the CTO was not 
considered in our analysis. For our assessment of readability, we used a 
metric that was simple to apply but considers only a limited number of 
factors such a sentence length and syllables-per-word. We did not un-
dertake to determine the extent to which this metric is a valid proxy for 
understandability by mental health patients or those who support them. 
Finally, the normative measure that we used in our quality assessment 
was confined to an assessment of the formal completeness of the SIDMA- 
reporting; we had no way of determining in any particular case whether 
SIDMA was actually present or absent in the person being assessed. 
8. Conclusion 
SIDMA is a concept unique to Scots law, representing a distinctive 
strategy in ongoing efforts to reform mental health legislation. The 
reliance on SIDMA in existing Scottish mental health legislation can be 
understood as a compromise position in the ongoing debates about 
fusion law. SIDMA incorporates an assessment of a patient's decision- 
making abilities into the procedure for authorising compulsion. How-
ever, it stops short of outlawing coercive treatment of patients who 
retain the mental capacity to make a treatment decision for themselves. 
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the most compre-
hensive analysis of how clinicians report SIDMA. Our analysis replicates 
and expands on work conducted ten years ago by Shek et al. (2010). That 
earlier study found that SIDMA was poorly recorded on reports for CTOs; 
our analysis shows that this is still the case. Beyond the fact that clini-
cians seemed to list more reasons for SIDMA, there did not appear to be a 
Box 3 
Example of the contents of a SIDMA field in which no causal or explanatory link is established to the person's decision-making abilities.  
It has been mentioned that the mental illness impacts patient concordance with treatment. There is a long history of mental illness and detained several 
times but still continues to relapse. The combination of issues - mental, social, drink misuse and background learning difficulty together will impact 
the recovery. Recently she was frequently absconding from Ward X and drinking and complicating her mental illness. Without proper containment of 
her mental health she will be at risk of disengaging from treatment.    
Box 4 
Examples of formally complete responses in the recording of evidence of SIDMA.  
Ms X, by reason of her intellectual disability, is unable to comprehend any complex information including the care and treatment that is provided or the 
rationale for it. I am therefore of the opinion that Ms X's ability to make informed decisions about the provision of medical treatment is significantly 
impaired. 
X's insight into his mental illness is variable with there being times that he does not accept he is mentally unwell. He remains very thought disordered 
which prevents him from understanding information about his illness and the need for treatment, and so his decision making regarding his medical 
treatment is significantly impaired.    
12 Cairns et al. (2005) have demonstrated that use of a structured approach in 
the assessment of decision-making capacity results in higher interrater 
reliability.  
13 Guidance from the Commission does not include ‘believing information’ 
among the components of the decision-making process (Mental Welfare Com-
mission for Scotland, 2017b: 13). By contrast, both the Training Manual and the 
Code of Practice for the Act specifically make reference to believing information 
in their discussion of SIDMA. The Training Manual indicates that ‘SIDMA occurs 
when a mental disorder affects the person's ability to believe, understand and 
retain information, and to make and communicate decisions’ (Scottish Execu-
tive, 2005a, 45; emphasis added). The Code of Practice describes factors to be 
considered in the assessment of SIDMA as including the ‘ability to believe, un-
derstand and retain information concerning their care and treatment’ (Scottish 
Executive, 2005b, para 1.22; emphasis added). While these various claims are 
not strictly inconsistent, they do not add up to a clear account of how a patient's 
lack of acceptance of illness should be factored in to an assessment of SIDMA. 
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great difference in the content of their descriptions, despite the fact that 
the SIDMA standard has now been in effect for more than 15 years. 
In coming to a considered view about SIDMA, attention should be 
given both to its promise and to the pitfalls that have manifested 
themselves in practice. Part of the original promise of SIDMA was to 
provide enhanced respect for patient autonomy in decisions about psy-
chiatric compulsion. The strategy for doing so was to incorporate an 
assessment of patients' ability to make care and treatment decision for 
themselves, reserving the recourse to compulsion for those whose ability 
to make such decisions was significantly impaired. But the lack of a 
statutory definition of SIDMA has been a pitfall on the path of imple-
mentation. In the absence of a definition that would project a structured 
framework for the assessment of SIDMA, the record suggests that SIDMA 
has not proven to be a robust tool for ensuring enhanced respect for 
patient autonomy. The Scottish experiment with SIDMA therefore pre-
sents valuable lessons for jurisdictions around the world which are 
considering reform strategies which retain provision for use of psychi-
atric compulsion while ensuring greater respect for patient autonomy 
and mitigating concerns about potential discrimination. 
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